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ABSTRACT:
Although increasing cybersecurity threats continue in libraries, not many studies are available
which examine surrounding cybersecurity policies. Even less has been done on specific types of
libraries such as academic and archives. When it comes to academic libraries, cybersecurity
policies take a top-down approach to managing and creating policies. The problem is that both
academic libraries and archives are unique areas within a university setting. Some of the general
policies do not always handle specific issues dealt with in an academic library or archives. This
paper investigates if an actual gap or void in policy exists which could create issues in academic
libraries and archives, as well as if the university cybersecurity policy is being communicated,
reviewed, reported, and created with inclusion of librarians and archivists. An 18-question survey
was administered to librarians, archivists, and university information technology cybersecurity
professionals within the 24 academic institutions of University Systems of Georgia (USG).
Twenty-seven respondents completed the survey. The survey was, then, analyzed according to
subcategories. A general theme emerged: communication of cybersecurity policy and the
inclusion of librarians and archivists in policy creation and reporting could improve cybersecurity
defense. The lack of participation and report feedback also lead to a very low perception or
barometer score (5.1 average on a 10-point scale) as to how well the cybersecurity plan was being
communicated. The solution to the communication gap could be in form of a plan. A conceptual
model entitled Communication Enlightenment Engagement Plan (CEEP) would increase
involvement by community engagement (inclusion, policy review, and policy creation.) Adding a
feedback loop to CEEP will aid in the engagement process as well as keeping top tiers of
management aware of policy changes and issues.
INDEX WORDS: Cybersecurity Policy, Libraries Cybersecurity, Libraries Cybersecurity Threat,
Cybersecurity Management, Cybersecurity Plan
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1. Introduction
Libraries are one of the most overlooked areas of cybersecurity. This author often wonders why
this is so. Is it because libraries do not deal with banking or health information? Instead,
libraries do deal with private information. Additionally, some people utilize libraries’ computers
to do many transactional-type actions such as tax returns, motor vehicle registration, student
loans, e-mails, etc. Often overlooked is the wealth of copyrighted academic knowledge held in
the databases that could be collected without permission. Digital collections that hold historical
information could also be corrupted.
Education information systems and university libraries are seeing an increased number of data
breaches, ransomware, and hacking attempts (Henig, p. 6, 2018). An estimated 171 million
Americans are registered to a library (Rocca & Burkhard, p. 1, 2019). Every day, thousands of
people walk into a library with the expectation of utilizing the resources available to them. Some
of these users bring with them devices to link to the network, while others just want to use the
resources that the library offers them (computers, network, electronic databases, digital
collections, etc.). These patrons do not want to wrestle with security issues to the extent that
their workflow becomes impeded. The American Library Association (ALA) describes
cybersecurity and libraries as user-friendly, because all library resources should be readily
accessible and privacy secured (ALA, 2016). For this reason, the library has had a relaxed
posture with cybersecurity and, thus, has been the target of cybersecurity attacks and hacks.
The article “Should libraries consider hacking back if attacked?” demonstrates the increasing
frustrations from cyber-attacks. Some noteworthy attacks are: Aaron Schwartz, who
downloaded 4 million academic articles from MIT; and another case, where a new electronic
textbook was altered to refer to slaves as unpaid interns (Smith, p.15, 2017). Smith is correct in
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pointing out that Archival digital collections within libraries’ collections are vulnerable, because
they are housed on different systems (Smith, p.15, 2017). For example, the Columbus State
University system’s digital collection is not on the same platform as the library’s e-books and
other collections.
1.1 Problem Statement
Considering the previously mentioned user-friendly and privacy concerns along with increasing
attacks coupled with multiple information systems running on the university network, this
explains why a general cybersecurity policy is difficult and, sometimes, in conflict with the
library’s cybersecurity policy. Additionally, an attitude exists that University Information
Technology Systems do not include the system librarians in policy and issues surrounding
cybersecurity. This project intends to explore and determine if there is evidence of a disconnect
in communication and policy creation between Librarians, Archivists, and University
Information Technology Systems in an academic setting such as the University Systems of
Georgia. This disconnect in communication of policies and current threats awareness can cause
the library to be vulnerable to cyberattacks.
1.2 Background Information
To understand the governance and communication issue of University Libraries, of vital
importance is to understand the tiers of how a technology policy is created and could be
governed. At Tier 1, the University System of Georgia Information Technical Service (USGITS)
creates policy for all information technical services (discussed more in “Details” section). At
Tier 2, each and every individual information technical service department is depicted. Lastly,
the system library, or library department, along with archives will be labeled Tier 3. This
demonstrates a top-down approach as to how cybersecurity policy is governed (See Figure 1).
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University System Of Georgia
Information Technical Services
(USGITS)

Tier 1

Tier 2

Tier 3

Any of the 26 USG universities
(UITS)

Columbus State Univiersity
(CSU)

Simon Schwob Library

Archives

Music Library

Corresponding
Libraries

Figure 1: University Policy Hierarchy

1.3 Literature Review
1.31 What are the issues surrounding university libraries and cybersecurity?
Physical security is an important role in cybersecurity, just as it is in large corporations. Things
such as natural disasters (fire, flood, tornado, earthquake, building collapse), vandalism, air
conditioner failure, etc., all affect hardware assets (Aije, p. 5 & 12, 2019). Along with these
hardware vulnerabilities comes software vulnerabilities. This can take many forms such as
trojans, worms, viruses, password sniffing hacking, spyware, adware, etc. (Aije, p. 6-7, 2019).
Additionally, data security threats can be present which range from destruction of resources,
corruption of information, theft in removal of other resources, interruption of services to
changing data, data loss, delay of dissemination, loss of privacy, copyright violations, and natural
disaster (Aije, p. 10, 2019). Furthermore, human error may be involved, including incorrect setup of security features, incorrect switching off equipment, deletion of files, inadequate back-ups,
and improper following of procedures (Aije, 2019).
1.32 Librarians and Policy
Besides Landgraf, the other two articles, Aije and Rudasill, have highlighted policy issues
surrounding libraries. Aije points out that university libraries’ issues with cybersecurity require
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“serious managerial and strategic attention.” (Aije, p. 17, 2019). Additionally, librarians need to
be included in policy and regulation decisions (Rudasill & Moyer, p. 254, 2004).
1.33 Balancing Privacy and Data Collection
As stated in the introduction, patrons do not want their privacy violated. The University of
Arizona collected data swipes of IDs to predict retention, progression, and graduation (Landgraf,
p. 1, 2018). The American Library Association has been on the side of Academic Freedom and
Privacy since it was founded, so much so, that it is coded in the Library Bill of rights, found at
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/academicfreedom. The Right to Privacy can be found
in Article VII of the ALA Bill of Rights which states, “All people, regardless of origin … The
right to privacy is the right to open inquiry without having one’s interest examined or scrutinized
by others … Confidentiality relates to records, computer sign-up sheets, websites visited …”
The problem occurs when data is required, by administration, for the library to prove that it is
being utilized and/or what is being utilized for funding, which this paper is not going to examine.
This point leads us to that which Landgraf elucidates: a regulatory framework relating to policy
needs to be updated to keep up with modern times (Landgraf, p. 2, 2018).
Additionally, a video produced by the Higher Education Information Security Council (HEISC),
entitled Campus cybersecurity teams face a broad range of challenges today, explains the value
of education data and the increasing number of attacks laying siege on campuses. According to
Bates et. al., the nine key challenges that education faces are as follows:
1) Sheer volume of digital assets,
2) Threat landscape more complex,
3) Intrusive data collection of social media,
4) Lax of internet of things devices (security - convenience versus security),
5) Continued growth compliance obligations,
6) Difficulty to retain and train staff,
7) Password reuse,
8) Risk management in the cloud, and
9) Balancing the open environment of education (Bates et. al., 2019).
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As one can see, many themes begin to merge. Users want the freedom to access the network and
be private. However, in doing so, security gaps can be created that pertain to the data being
stored on the network.
2.0 Detail Review of University Systems of Georgia Information Technology Services
Policy (Tier 1) and Issues with Communication Framework at the University and Library
Level (Tier 3)
The literature review provides significant evidence that library security policy is lacking, and the
threat landscape is dangerous. To understand the lack of a cybersecurity policy as a problem, it
might be useful to, first, understand organization structure and policies at each level of a large
university system. In this case, we will use University Systems of Georgia Information
Technical Services (USGITS - https://www.usg.edu/information_technology_services/),
Columbus State University Information Technical Services (CSUITS), and the Columbus State
University Simon Schwob Libraries (CSUSSL).
Starting at the head of the institution of USGITS, one can examine the policy handbook, found at
https://www.usg.edu/assets/information_technology_services/documents/2020_IT_Handbook.pd
f, located on the webpage https://www.usg.edu/cybersecurity/policies_and_reports.
What is interesting is that in both the USGITS webpage and in the introduction of the
handbook it mentions this statement: “As noted in Section 5.2.2 of the Information
Technology Handbook, USG institutions, the USO, the GPLS, and the Georgia Archives
are responsible for the designation of officials within their organization to fulfill key
security functions and report on its status of compliance with security policy, standards
and procedures.” – (Board of Regents of University of Georgia (BRUG), 2020)
2.1 Point 1: (Fair Representation)
It is unclear if a university library delegate is represented in the creation of these policies and
procedures. The above statement from Section 5.2.2 reads that a university representative,
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archival representative, and a general public librarian are part of the policy creation. NIST
Framework 1.0, Framework Introduction, addresses stakeholders as critical members of the
community (NIST, p. 1, 2018). One might argue this is somewhat covered in 1.2.1 (identify) of
the Information Technology Handbook (ITH), which states that stakeholders of the organization
will participate and have shared responsibilities to assure resource needs. (Discussion continues
within Issues With Each Point Explained (IWEPE) Section Point 1 of this paper.)
2.2 Point 2: (Clearly Defined Outcomes)
Section 5.5 states, “The USG CISO shall also maintain risk management implementation
standards that the USG organizations must consider in the development of their individualized
risk management plans.” Much of what is first written pertains to risk management. The goals
are not clearly stated; however, what is stated in this section are the activities that the
organization will follow. (Discussion continues within (IWEPE) Section Point 2 of this paper.)
2.3 Point 3: (Well-Defined Communication of Framework)
It is hard to determine if there is a formal communication plan. The ITH mentions, throughout,
who reports to whom. Additionally, the ITH mentions what reports and forms are to be filled
out. (Discussion continues within (IWEPE) Section Point 3 of this paper.)
The policy on the institutional level has been examined. Now, the policy at the singular
university level must, also, be examined. Paul Luft examined the NIST standards at Columbus
State University and wrote a report which is listed in Appendix A. The main point is this:
Review of 27 Information Security Policies at Columbus State University,
Columbus, GA, were paired with NIST standards found at
https://nvd.nist.gov/. The 5 controls that are either deficient or missing (will
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be further explained) are AC-10, AC-11, AC-12, AC-18, and AC-19. Twenty
controls were found in accordance with NIST STANDARDS.
2.4 Point 4: (Review of Standards)
Who is reviewing the standards between the tiers? Are they just reviewing the standards at the
university to NIST, or to the institutional policies, or to both? (Discussion continues within
(IWEPE) Section Point 4 of the paper.)
2.5 Point 5: (University Library-Level Cybersecurity Policy –Should It Exist?)
Very few university libraries have their own cybersecurity policy. Indiana University (I.U.) has
a library cybersecurity policy located at https://policies.iu.edu/policies/lib-01-librariesprivacy/index.html. This policy, and most other university libraries which have cybersecurity
policies, contains a statement that reads something like, “This library adheres or follows the
university IT policy.” The I.U. library cybersecurity policy has a section dedicated to privacy
rights, third-party software, and data destruction. (Discussion continues (IWEPE) Section Point
5 of the paper.)
3.0 Issues with Each Point Explained (Each Point will be addressed)
3.1 Issue with Point 1: Fair Representation
When an organization gets large, with many branches located in different geographical places,
this organization must have fair representation during policy and procedure creation. This author
believes that USGITS has not accomplished this with their 1.2.1 Shared Governance
Framework (ITH, p.12, 2020).
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3.2 Issue with point 2: Clearly Defined Outcomes
If other Information Technology Service departments throughout the USG system are to use this
document to develop or adapt policy, an easy way needs to exist to find the clear objectives
concerning cybersecurity. This document was not easy to follow.
3.3 Issue with point 3: Well-Defined Communication of Framework
A formal structure of who reports to whom and what reports are to be filled out must be defined,
along with an assessment cycle defined as to when reports are due. Unfortunately, how other
facilities fit into this structure is hard to see. Therefore, a diagram is needed to understand and
illustrate the communication process, such as the one seen in the NIST Framework for
Improving Critical Instructure.
3.4 Issue with point 4: Review of Standards (Tiers 1, 2, 3 & NIST)
Cybersecurity policy review is occurring, and USGITS updates their handbook. As stated per
policy, communication of those changes is being passed on to the CIOs. The CIOs, then, ensure
that these processes are being written into current policy and, subsequently, communicated to the
university departments (Tier 3) that utilize the network (like the library). However, nowhere are
notification of standards and changes communicated to departments at the university level. It is
safe to assume that this notification process falls on the responsibility of the University ITS to
communicate these changes. A formal communication plan would assure that communication to
departments has been received. This is an important point, because it leads into Point 5.
3.5 Issue with point 5: University Library-Level (Tier 2) Cybersecurity Policy – Should It
Exist?
While not many university libraries’ have cybersecurity policies, some libraries have
cybersecurity policies in addition to UITS. UITS and USGIT policy do not appear to handle the
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working environment of the library. The fact that the library at IU had to draft a policy on
privacy, third-party software, and data destruction separate from the UITS should demonstrate
the need for librarians to be part of the UITS cybersecurity policy. The working environment is
more complex than just device linkup on the network.
3.6 An Additional Point: Working Library Environment (Tier 3)
In examining the cybersecurity policies at the university level (Tier 3), no policies or procedures
were found regarding what to do when devices are found without an owner in the library, such as
thumb drives. Thumb drives are left behind by students on a regular basis. Nowhere within the
policy are statements regarding how to handle these types of items. Typically, a library worker
will plug a thumb drive into a library computer to try to find its owner. This can be dangerous,
because somebody may have perpetrated a malicious act by planting a virus onto the network in
this manner.
Next is the examination and inspection of equipment. Nowhere was listed guidance from UITS
about laptops, Chromebooks, or phone cables that were checked out by a student and, later,
returned. Malicious software or hijacking software could be placed on this equipment. Yes,
UITS has installed safeguards, so that students cannot install software. Nevertheless, what if a
student was clever enough to put a hijacking piece of equipment onto the laptop or charger cord.
This has been done with cell phone charger cords (which some libraries allow to be checked
out). This illustrates the point that, without a librarian on the cybersecurity policy creation side
of things, there will be no policy about this type of attack. Libraries formulate their own policies
and procedures regarding how to handle these things without guidance from cybersecurity
experts.
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4.0 Arrival of the Problem Statement
Plenty of evidence demonstrates that university libraries lack cybersecurity policies to deal with
the changing threats, as stated in the literature review. Additionally, users of the library, along
with the ALA, almost demand “user-friendly” access to the network. The daily issues and
pressures on the library can only be understood by those who work in the library. Policy
development takes place two tiers up in the University of Georgia Systems, without inclusion of
a university librarian. Public librarians have been consulted, but their needs and functions are
very different than those of university librarians. To add even more confusion, the archives are
represented which also have different concerns than those of a university library. A viable
solution would have a university systems librarian sit on the panel of policy makers.
Additionally, a systems librarian should be part of the cybersecurity policy at the university
level, at the very least (Tier 2). If this were to occur, then at least the CIO at the university level
would be aware of the cybersecurity and workflow struggles of the library. Furthermore, this
would aid in policy implementation, training, and awareness of cybersecurity within library staff.
While this paper did not research library staff training and awareness, articles have been written
about this topic which also led to the conclusion of a lack of training and awareness of library
staff.
4.1 Thus, The Problem Statement
This project intends to explore if there is evidence of a disconnect in communication and policy
creation between Librarians, Archivists, and University Information Technology Systems in an
academic setting such as the University Systems of Georgia. This disconnect in communication
of policies and current threats awareness can cause the library to be vulnerable to cyberattacks.
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5.0 Study of University of Georgia (USG) System Librarians, Archivist, and Cybersecurity
Information Specialist
A survey was conducted of System Librarians, Archivists, and Cybersecurity Information
Specialists within the 24 academic institutions with the University System of Georgia (USG).
The survey had 7 sections, with 16 questions devoted to understanding the issues of
communication and policy creation as they pertain to cybersecurity policy within academic
libraries and archives. The survey sections are as follows:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Standard informed Consent (1 Question)
Section 1: Background Information (2 Questions)
Section 2: Prioritizing and Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats (2 Questions)
Section 3: Direct Communication of Policy (4 Questions)
Section 4: Cybersecurity Policy Creation or Participation (3 Questions)
Section 5: Reporting Procedures (4 Questions)
Section 6: Things that get left out (1 Question)
Section 7: Overall Reflective Barometer (1 Question)

For full details of the Qualtrics Survey refer to Appendix B.
All participants remained anonymous, and Qualtrics’ settings for recording the http address were
turned off. All questions were optional, and participants were permitted to exit the survey at any
time (Please see Appendix B - Informed Consent Section). Additionally, very job-specific
participants were chosen for this survey. This means that these individuals were the most likely
to participate in the culture of cybersecurity policy creation. For example, a systems librarian
would be more likely to handle databases and network issues than a subject-specialist or servicetype librarian. Likewise, a cybersecurity information technology specialist is more likely to
manage, create, and distribute cybersecurity policy than a general help-desk information
assistant. This is important, because the objective is to gauge library cybersecurity policy
communication, creation, and participation.
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6.0 Results and Discussion of the Survey
Qualtrics-provided report and crosstab functions were utilized to provide the results.
Abbreviations refer to the following:
SL = System Librarian
CIT = Cybersecurity Information Technologist
A = Archivist
Qx = Question and (x) is a placeholder for a number that would be used, for example Q2 would
be Question 2
6.1 Analysis of Section 1: Background Information (2 Questions)
Q1 Please identify which of the following group you belong to:
Q1 reveals a study group composed of 19 System Librarians, 7 Archivists, and 7 Cybersecurity
Information Specialists.

Figure 2: Survey Correspondents Makeup

Q2 pertains to which academic institution the participant belongs. Significant difference is noted
between the number of participants and the names of institutions. This could be attributed to the
nature of the subject. Participants may be somewhat skeptical about Qualtrics tracing the
responses back to the participant.
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Q3 was screened and omitted before the survey was conducted. This question seemed like either
a repeat or ambiguous, as it related to question 4. It was, therefore, omitted.
6.2 Analysis of Section 2: Prioritizing and Awareness of Cybersecurity Threats
(2 Questions)
Q4 - Rank the following 22 cybersecurity concerns as according to priority, with 0 being the
lowest concern and 10 being the highest concern:
High Priority: A cybersecurity threat that you perceive will likely happen, causing severe issues
with workflow and privacy AND no matter what little budget you have, you would put money
toward combating the threat.
Medium Priority: A cybersecurity threat that you perceive may happen with consequence to
workflow and privacy AND are willing to put some money on a limited budget toward
combating the threat.
Low Priority: A cybersecurity threat that is unlikely to happen but still might have consequences
to workflow and privacy AND you would only put money toward combating the threat if you
had extra money to do so. The total group (SL, CIT, A) prioritized the threats as follows:
This table data can be found in a larger size in Appendix C.
Table 1: Perceived Cybersecurity Threat Data
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Figure 3: Cybersecurity Prioritization
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All three groups identified Email Phishing Attacks as the top concern. This scored a mean score
of 8. The next highest concern identified was Personal Identification on Networks which
produced a mean score of 7. The third highest concern, with a mean score of 6, was a tie
between the following six threats: Ransomware of Library Systems, Copyright Infringement of
Journal Databases/Thesis/Research, Personal Identification Theft Associated with Library Wi-Fi,
Malware from Lost & Found Personal Devices such as USB, Malware on Library Patron
Computers, and Password Protection of Library Systems.
Top Concern - Email Phishing Attacks
Second Top Concern - Personal Identification on Networks
Third Set of Concerns - This set consists of: Ransomware of Library Systems, Copyright
Infringement of Journal Databases/Thesis/Research, Personal Identification Theft Associated
with Library Wi-Fi, Malware from Lost & Found Personal Devices such as USB, Malware on
Library Patron Computers, and Password Protection of Library Systems.
Middle Set of Concerns - The next section has been labeled the middle set of concerns, with a
mean score of 5 and with the most threat categories listed in the set. The middle set of concerns
consists of: Copyright Infringement of Electronic Archival Material, Data Breach from Library
Computers and Servers, Personal Identification Theft Associated Library Accounts, Man-in-theMiddle Attack (people hijacking or listening in on the network), Network Listening Devices
(library patrons), Unauthorized Access of Network from within the Library i.e., Wi-Fi Range
Network and Equipment Tamper (computer, USB cords, fax machines, wall outlets, charging
stations), Unauthorized Access of Library Network, Archival Digital Collection Protection from
Corruption or Malicious Alteration.
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Bottom Set of Concerns - The bottom concerns have a mean score of 4 and consist of Journal
Database Theft, Digital Collection Theft, Personal Identification Theft associated with Archive
Accounts, Personal Identification Theft associated with Library RFID (pretend you have one, if
you do not), Personal Identification Theft associated with Archive Billing and/or Outside
University Request.
Top 3 Sets
When examining standard deviations of each of these sets, it is important to take note of the
following concepts. When a standard deviation is between 2 and 2.5, this indicates that 95
percent of the responses are within the mean score. When examining both Top Concern and
Second Top Concern, their standard deviations fall between this 2 - 2.5 standard deviation range.
Thus, the data scores collected from the group are close. This would indicate that most of the
spread is “tight”, and general consensus and confidence of this score is high. In the Third Top
Set, the standard deviation falls within the 2.5 - 3.0 range which is still considered a fairly tight
cluster. One thing to note is that on the threat issue of Ransomware of Library Systems, the
standard deviation has the most spread at 2.97 with a variance of 5.79 on a scale of 1-10. This is
a very strong variance of opinions which is worth noting.
Middle Sets
When examining the Middle Set, the standard deviation ranges between 2.5 - 3.21. This
indicates the spread from the mean is widening. Only one threat ranged outside the 3.0 range,
Archival Digital Collection Protection from Corruption or Malicious Alteration. On the threat
issue of Data Breach from Library Computers and Servers, survey participants were beginning to
indicate a wider opinion with the standard deviation of 2.98.
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Bottom Sets
The Bottom Sets have the largest standard deviation with variations. The standard deviation for
the bottom ranges from 2.64 - 3.29 with a variation ranging from 7 - 10 on a 10-point scale. This
indicates a significant difference in opinions on the threats listed in this group.
Q5 - Were you aware of these threats?

Figure 4: Cybersecurity Threat Awareness

Awareness reveals that 22 out of 27 participants are aware of the majority of the threats the
library faces. This is a very good number, indicating that SL, CIT, and A are very
knowledgeable and are concerned with cybersecurity. This could mean that if these participants
were included in policy conversations, they may have an added value or opinion.
6.3 Analysis of Section 3: Direct Communication of Policy (4 Questions)
Q6 - How well do you feel that cybersecurity policy is communicated to your department?

Figure 5: Cybersecurity Department Communication
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Of the 26 persons surveyed, 17 indicated that they feel that communication of cybersecurity
within the department is going well. A total of 9 participants responded neutrally, somewhat not
well, or not at all well. Remember that 7 of the participants are UITS cybersecurity specialists.
If those 7 particular participants are subtracted from the overall results, that would leave 10 out
of the remaining 19 participants, only slightly more than half, who feel that cybersecurity is
being communicated at least somewhat well.
Q7 - How familiar are you with all aspects of university cybersecurity policy?

Figure 6: Cybersecurity University Policy Familiarization

Regarding the 26 participants, 9 reported that they were either neutral, somewhat unfamiliar, or
very unfamiliar with university cybersecurity policy. Again, subtracting the 7 cybersecurity
specialists out of the participants, the reconsidered result is 9 out of 19 respondents.
Conversely, this indicates that only slightly over 50 percent of librarians and archivists were
familiar with university cybersecurity policy.
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Q8 - How often do you review the policy for policy changes?

Figure 7: Cybersecurity Policy Review

The majority (13/26) of participants indicated that they review the university cybersecurity
policy every year. Five more participants indicate reviewing every 6 months. This indicates that
the majority of participants will dedicate some of their time to the review of cybersecurity policy,
if it is available. However, there were still 4 participants who reported that they have never
reviewed cybersecurity policy changes. This suggests that there is room for improvement.
Q9 - How are new policy changes communicated to you? (May Select Multiple Answers)

Figure 8: Cybersecurity Policy Communication after Changes

20

This question clarified that the vast majority of communication of policy comes from one of
three sources: direct email, website updates, or meeting announcements.
6.4 Analysis of Section 4: Cybersecurity Policy Creation or Participation (3 Questions)
Q10 - I have been involved in creating cybersecurity policy for the library.

Figure 9: Cybersecurity Inclusion in Policy Creation

This chart indicates that 69.23 percent of respondents have not participated in library
cybersecurity policy creation, and only 11.54 percent have or are involved in cybersecurity
policy creation. More on this topic will be available in the survey conclusion section.
Q11 - Have you ever been asked to provide your opinion about university cybersecurity policy?

Figure 10: Cybersecurity Policy Inclusion
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Only 26.92 percent of participants indicated that they have been asked an opinion on
cybersecurity policy. This leaves 61.54 who have never been asked for their opinion.
Q12 - How often is library cybersecurity policy reviewed for changes or edits?

Figure 11: Cybersecurity Policy Review Frequency

21 of the participants indicated that they have no set schedule for library cybersecurity review or
changes. This is an alarming finding that will be further discussed in the survey conclusion.
6.5 Analysis of Section 5: Reporting Procedures (4 Questions)
Q13 - Have you reported a cybersecurity issue or asked to resolve a cybersecurity issue or event?

Figure 12: Cybersecurity Occurrence
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52% of participants have either reported or been asked to resolve a cybersecurity issue. Even
taking out the 7 CITs, this is a significant number (6/18) which is one-third of librarians or
archivists who have witnessed a cybersecurity event.
Q14 - If Yes, was the result of the report ever communicated back to you or was a policy changed
from UITS resulting from the report?

Figure 13: Report Feedback Loop

While this question does not apply to most of the participants, it is significant to note that four
participants who reported an event did not receive any kind of report or indication of what
happened to that event.
Q15 - Have you ever been shown any reports indicating threats or activities of possible
threats?

Figure 14: Cybersecurity Awareness of Possible Threats

Only 12 (48%) out of 25 participants have received reports indicating threats or possible threats.
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Q16 - Are you ever given any indication of the health/quality/status of your cybersecurity
efforts?

Figure 15: Network Health Status

Only 8 (32%) out 25 participants indicated that they receive some kind of status or health report
of cybersecurity efforts.
6.6 Analysis of Section 6: Things That Get Left Out (1 Question)
Q17 - Are you aware of any library or archive cybersecurity policies that are not included in
university general cybersecurity policies (examples -- Thumb drive discovery of unknown
owner that is screened for antivirus before inserted into computer to find its owner, or library
cell phone cords checked for inserted hijacking or listening devices, etc.)? If yes, please give
the name of policy and, if you could, the general gist of the policy.
Table 2: Cybersecurity Survey Comments

#

Direct Comments from the Survey

1

Yes, it falls in the policy of appropriate use.

2

Our library should have them or reference them in their Departmental Information
Security Plan that they review each year and have everyone in the department sign.

3

At this time, I do not know of any outside policies for our library that do not directly
come from the system-wide cybersecurity policies in place. We do not open abandoned
thumb drives to find their owners' information (kept in a safe lock).

4

We do not open abandoned thumb drives to find their owners' information (kept in a
safe location for 24 hours before taking them to lost and found).
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5

We do not loan out charging cords. (We have one charging station directly across
from our circulation desk).

6

No specific library policies beyond university policies; common-sense treatment of lost
USB drives - not to be inserted into library computers.

7

As a whole, most of our online policies are less than to be desired. I do know ITS is
actively reviewing and updating old policies.

Responses 1 and 6 indicate a lack of policy. Response 7 indicates need for policy improvement.
Responses 3 and 4 may indicate that this is just a procedural norm with no formal policy.
6.7 Analysis of Section 7: Overall Reflective Barometer (1 Question)
Q18 - How well do you feel that cybersecurity policy is communicated to your department
on a scale 1-10, with 10 being that cybersecurity policies are communicated clearly through
proper modes of delivery and with appropriate frequency?
The mean average for the group was 5.1 as indicated by Figure 16. Table 2 represents the
barometer readings relating to each correspondence rating. Only 10 respondents rated
communication of cybersecurity policy as a 7 or higher. While 11 of the respondents rated
communication of policy as a 5 or lower.
Table 3: Barometer Rating Responses

Figure 16: Cybersecurity Barometer
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6.8 Survey Improvement Considerations
Because the sample population consisted of 32 participants from 24 academic institutions, this
sample population might be considered a small sample size. A recommendation for a greater
number of participants and academic institutions could be made and, subsequently, compared to
the results found in this paper. Additionally, some librarians, when contacted, had a problem
with the term “system librarian”. This is because some academic institutions do not have a
librarian who does only system librarian work. Some institutions are very integrated with
university information systems. They may have a person from UITS designated to the library
network. Perhaps the survey, next time, should just use the term librarians or University
Information Technologies that would handle cybersecurity functions.
7.0 Survey Conclusion
Prioritization of cybersecurity threats vary widely among the following threats:
Table 4: Highest Variance Rates Amongst Cybersecurity Threats

Threat

Mean Variance

Std

Personal Identification Theft Associated with Archive
Accounts
Personal Identification Theft Associated with Archive
Billing and/or Outside University Request
Digital Collection Theft
Archival Digital Collection Protection from Corruption
or Malicious Alteration
Network Listening Devices (Library Patrons)
Equipment Tamper (computer, USB cords, fax
machines, wall outlets, charging stations)
Data Breach from Library Computers and Servers
Ransomware of Library Systems

4.4

11.52

3.39

4.38

10.9

3.3

4.46
5.0

10.33
10.32

3.21
3.21

4.88
4.73

9.47
8.89

3.08
2.98

5.2
5.58

8.88
8.47

2.98
2.91

This particular set of threats is where Librarians, Archivists, and University Information
Technologists begin to differ in opinion as to whether or where to spend resources (money,
technology, time) to monitor or defend from cyber-attacks. Librarians and Archivists view these
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threats as high priority, while University Information Technology Services view these threats as
low priority. To compound this problem, the Tier 3 University System of Georgia Information
Technical Service (USGITS) is more than likely in line with UITS and, also, views these threats
as low priority. (Again, it would be beneficial to conduct another survey to compare this).
These particular threats are especially vulnerable to attacks, because the policy creation and
provision of resources (money, technology, time) are dictated from the higher management tier
3, such as the USGITS. USGITS, more than likely, views these cybersecurity threats as a low
priority, but Librarians and Archivists do not view these threats as a low priority.
The good news is that a majority (81.5%) of the participants are aware of the majority of the
threats as interpreted from question 5. This would indicate that there is a good chance that if SL,
A, and CIT work together on cybersecurity policy, then they would not get stuck so much on the
definition or knowledge of these types of cybersecurity issues.
7.1 Cybersecurity Communication Gap
One of the problems is communication of cybersecurity policy which is identified multiple times
in the survey. Question 6 demonstrates that 50% of the SL and A do not feel that cybersecurity
is communicated well within the department. This question is nearly repeated in the barometer
question (Q18) which allows the participants to gauge their feelings about cybersecurity
communication. The results are 5.1 average on a 10-point scale barometer. Both question 6 and
question 18 demonstrate that the majority of participants do not feel cybersecurity policy is being
communicated clearly, appropriately, or frequently enough. Question 7 also demonstrates that,
after factoring out UITS, 50 percent of the participants are only somewhat unfamiliar or totally
unfamiliar with the university cybersecurity policies. When examining the results from
questions 6, 7, and 18, the theme of communication of policy is becoming an issue at the
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university level. The main point here is that if the staff members do not think communication is
going well, then cybersecurity policy and implementation of new cybersecurity policy will not be
as effective, potentially producing gaps or breakdowns in defense from cyber-attacks.
7.2 Cybersecurity Policy Inclusion and Creation
As cybersecurity policy pertains to creating, or participating in creating, cybersecurity on the
university level, questions 10, 11, and 12 demonstrate a severe lack of cybersecurity policy
creation or community. Question 10 indicates that 69.23 percent of respondents have not
participated in library cybersecurity policy creation. Question 11 demonstrates 61.54 of
participants have never been asked an opinion on cybersecurity policy. Question 12 reveals that
8 out of the 13 participants who actually have been involved with cybersecurity only make
changes to policy after an event has occurred instead of on a cyclic basis. When examining these
three questions (10, 11, and 12), a real lack of participation and added guidance of policy from
SL, A, and CIT becomes apparent. The lack of participation leads to problems with enthusiasm,
improved protection, and community engagement. How can improvement be expected in this
environment when the answer is that policy is only changed when an event happens? How can
community involvement be built when the answer to how often cybersecurity policy is reviewed
is 2 years to never (question 8)? In resolving the communication issue of cybersecurity policy,
community involvement must be in the solution.
7.3 Cybersecurity Reporting and Feedback
Reporting is a major part of cybersecurity policy; questions 13, 14, 15, and 16 probe into this
issue. Table 5 is data gathered from the survey and parsed out according to Librarians and
Archivists.
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Table 5: Reporting/Feedback/Status Reports

Q13 - Have you reported a cybersecurity issue or asked to resolve a cybersecurity issue or
event?
Reported Cybersecurity
Never Reported
Event or Issue
Cybersecurity Event or Issue
Librarians & Archivists
8/26 (30.76%)
12/26 (46.15%)
Cybersecurity Information
7/7 (100%)
Technologists
Q14 - If Yes, was the result of the report ever communicated back to you or was a policy
changed from UITS resulting from the report?

Librarians & Archivists

Yes, report communicated
back
6/8 (75%)

No, report was not
communicated back
2/8 (25%)

Cybersecurity Information
4/7 (57.14%)
3/7 (42.86%)
Technologists
Q15 - Have you ever been shown any reports indicating threats or activities of possible
threats?
Shown report
Not shown a report
Librarians & Archivists
13/26 (50%)
13/26 (50%)
Cybersecurity Information
7/7 (100%)
Technologists
Q16 - Are you ever given any indication of the health/quality/status of your cybersecurity
efforts?
Yes
No
Librarians & Archivists

11/26 (16.27%)

15/26 (57.69%)

Cybersecurity Information
Technologists

5/7 (71.43)

2/7 (28.57%)

An interesting finding is that 52 % (13/25) of all participants had reported a cybersecurity event.
Moreover, almost 31 % of the 52 % are Librarians and Archivists. Noteworthy, is that 100 % of
the Cybersecurity Information Technologists have reported a cybersecurity event. The main
takeaway point is that Librarians and Archivists are facing cybersecurity issues on the ground
level and are, subsequently, attempting to report these events. In question 14 findings, 75% of
Librarians and Archivists of events reported resulted in a cybersecurity policy change with
notification to the reportees that a policy had occurred. This means that 25% of the reported
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cases have no communication or response that anything has been done with their reported
incident (not factoring in UITS personnel). This could lead to discouraging reporting behaviors;
for instance, if those who report do not believe that anything is going to be done or that their
report is pointless, then why report it in the first place? Again, a communication plan would
include a feedback loop so that reports filed are closed with a response from the cybersecurity
team. The report filed from the cybersecurity team needs to detail what actions were or were not
taken and/or their recommendations. Along these same lines are the question 15 findings which
indicate that only 50 percent of Librarians and Archivists have ever seen a threat/incident-type
report. That is compared to 100% of Cybersecurity Information Technology Specialists. This
means that the university cybersecurity professionals have the information but, for some reason,
do not think it is important to pass it on to the departments within the university. Question 16 is
similar to question 15 in that participants are asked if they are given any indication of the health
status of the network. A similar percentage, 57.69 percent of Librarians and Archivists, had not
received any kind of health status on their network. As part of the communication loop, it is
essential for cybersecurity professionals to let the community they protect and serve know what
is happening in cyberspace. This, in turn, increases vigilance and reporting efforts.
7.4 Policy Improvement
Nothing noticeable appears at first glance of the responses to the open-ended question 17.
However, upon closer examination, two responses suggest policy improvement and two
responses suggest policy omission. If higher education libraries are expected to protect patrons
and be protected from cybersecurity threats, such as ransomware and malware prioritized in the
Third Set Figure 17, a policy regarding lost-and-found thumb drives and electronic devices needs
to be clearly defined.
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7.5 Summary Recap
A difference of prioritization of cybersecurity threats occurs between Librarians, Archivists, and
Information Technology Professionals. This may lead to policy omissions or incomplete
cybersecurity policies. Additionally, while not examined in this survey, this may also lead to
resource allocations deficits by prioritizing what those who occupy Tier 3 think are the most
important cybersecurity issues. A communication gap or disconnect exists when considering the
cybersecurity needs of those who occupy Tier 1 (Librarians and Archivists). This is shown in
the survey when examining inclusion and policy creation. While not succinctly proven by this
survey, although signs of such are noticeable, enthusiasm or lack thereof could contribute to this
problem, because, perhaps, Librarians and Archivists do not feel like they are a part of the
cybersecurity efforts. A severe issue with the reporting loop is apparent; many of the
participants are not receiving information on current cybersecurity threats and the health of the
network. Again, this could lead to Librarians and Archivists not feeling part of the cybersecurity
defense, creating a possible lack of enthusiasm. Of note are the comments in question 17 that
read:
“As a whole, most of our online policies are less than to be desired. I do know ITS is actively
reviewing and updating old policies.”
This indicates that Librarians and Archivists are not satisfied with the current state of
cybersecurity policies in their institutions. A barometer reading of 5.1 from System Librarians
and a 3.5 from Archivists indicates that communication of cybersecurity policy is weak in
aspects of clarity, modes of delivery, and appropriate frequency (as seen in Figure 17).
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Communication Barometer
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Question 18: Comunication Barometer
System Librarian

Archivisits

Cybersecurity Information Technologist

Figure 17: Communication Barometer

The average score for the communication of cybersecurity information technologist is 7,
indicating this group believes that communication of the cybersecurity policy in terms of clarity,
frequency and mode is above average. A distinct difference in opinion on how each group views
the communication issues is noticeable. In order to bring these scores closer to alignment, a
different approach to community engagement might be helpful.
8.0 Proposed Policy Solution of Communication Enlightenment Engagement Plan (CEEP)
One possible solution is a Communication Enlightenment Engagement Plan (CEEP) which
connects the issues of communication, engagement, and status as they pertain to cybersecurity
issues, events, and policy among Tier 1 (USGITS), with Tier 3 (Librarians/Archivists
departments), and involves Tier 2 (UITS).
CEEP would have a policy creation and review mechanism as shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: CEEP Conceptual Model

This process would increase awareness, participation, and inclusion with cybersecurity policy.
Sometimes, cooperation is pertinent to implementation and buy-in (following policy) as it relates
to success in security measures. Additionally, if cybersecurity leaders and/or defenders of
cybersecurity policy are available within the departments in which the policy governs, the
department is more likely to follow policy. Thus, this creates a feeling of cybersecurity
awareness. This has a high potential of an increased cybersecurity barometer recording; in
which case, a future survey could be done from the baseline reading collected from this survey.
(In other words: somebody might consider doing a study on this point.)
CEEP needs a report feedback loop between all tiers (1, 2, and 3).
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Figure 19: Report Feedback Loop

The blue represents Tier 3; the yellow, Tier 2; and the green, Tier 1. A report filed in Tier 3
(Library/Archives) is received by both Tier 2 (UITS) and Tier 1 (USGITS). Tier 2 begins to
resolve the issue and, eventually, reports back to Tier 1. Tier 3 might be brought into the resolve
process, depending on the issue. Now, of course, this is an oversimplification of the process.
The point is: some kind of communication needs to take place between the tiers in order for
those occupying Tier 3 to know what the issue was and how this issue is being addressed instead
of going into some kind of a void. Tier 1 needs to have documentation of the events that are
being addressed at the lower levels in order to make policy decisions concerning departments.
This also helps with the cybersecurity review and policy creation process, as shown in Figure 18.
When Tier 3 makes a recommendation, and it passes through to Tier 2, Tier 3 may reference
events that took place leading to the policy recommendation, and Tier 1 would have the
documentation supporting the changes being recommended.
A CEEP would mitigate the risk of the cybersecurity issues stated above. The title CEEP is used
instead of Cybersecurity Communication Plan, because the latter often pertains to crisis
management and response. I would like to extend that to include communication of policy,
reporting of events, reporting of solutions, reporting the status of attacks, and inclusion of policy
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creation. Many academic institutions dictate policy from top tiers of governance down to the
university level. As seen from this survey, certain departments are excluded from policy creation
and reporting. Enterprise Architecture has demonstrated in larger organizations a need to have
both inclusion and communication of policies between departments in order to be effective,
especially during a time of crisis. More importantly, specific issues and concerns that both
Librarians and Archivists deal with do not fit neatly into general all-encompassing top tier
university information systems technology policy. This leads to security gaps that could be
exploited, because no one has even considered or been consulted. These circumstances might
lead to the next academic cybersecurity breach.
9.0 Conclusion
The survey recap section points to compelling evidence of a communication gap between tiers, a
lack of inclusion in policy creation, and no feedback loop when reporting events. These three
issues contribute to a feeling of an inferior cybersecurity policy. As prioritizing threats, a strong
agreement among the top 2 tiers of threats exists; however, once an observer examines the Third
Set of threats, a large variance of agreement becomes apparent. This has an impact on where
money and resource allocations will be distributed when deciding cybersecurity defense. Money
allocation also affects cybersecurity policy or the effectiveness of the policy. While this survey
did not review the direct effects of the morale barometer (Survey Question 18) on reporting and
carrying out policy, an argument could be made if the departments do not feel their efforts are
being acknowledged or are left out of the policy creation, then this could lead to poor reporting
efforts.
The results from the survey indicate that a top-down approach has resulted in communication
issues. Although this author has offered CEEP as one possible solution, which is both bottom-up
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feedback with a top-down governance approach, more alternatives could be explored. However,
the way the policy is created, communicated, and reviewed seems to lead to a poor barometer of
cybersecurity policy in current USG institutions. This result could lead to poor cybersecurity
defense which could be remedied by simple inclusion of input in policy creation and review from
the end department.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A: Columbus State University Policy Review & NIST
27 UITS Information Security Policies Found at
https://infosec.columbusstate.edu/securitypolicies/security_policies.php
Access Control Policy
https://infosec.columbusstate.edu/securitypolicies/user_access_control_policy.pdf
By Paul Luft
Policy Review Continued on Next Page
NO.
AC-1

CONTROL
ACCESS CONTROL
POLICY AND
PROCEDURES

AC-2

ACCOUNT
MANAGEMENT
ACCESS
ENFORCEMENT

AC-3

YES NO NOTES
X
Some things are still vague here. There is no
scope subsection which is sort of listed in
Purpose. Coordination is somewhat there
(Banner, HR, Students).
X
This does define Account Managers.
X

AC-4

INFORMATION FLOW
ENFORCEMENT

X

AC-5

SEPARATION OF
DUTIES
LEAST PRIVILEGE

X

AC-7

UNSUCCESSFUL
LOGON ATTEMPTS

X

AC-8

SYSTEM USE
NOTIFICATION

X

AC-6

X

This, to me, comes in the form of the Login
Policy and Password Policy.
There are control enhancements that I feel
would be an improvement. As stated in the
Login Policy, biometrics and duo
authentication is not allowed.
States that access is granted according to
duties. This is done to protect duties. This
might be considered an Enhanced feature of
AC-3(7).
I feel this is covered in Network ID Policy to
define responsibilities of users.
This is, definitely, covered in Network ID
Policy. This has some enhanced features such
as review of policies (AC-6). Also, special
circumstances are mentioned in Network
Policy.
This information is stated in the CSU Password
Policy. Also, enhanced control measures are
mentioned on mobile devices in Portable
Devices Policy.
This does display One USG authentication.
This one, to me, is kind of hard to find within
all the policies. There is a little bit located in
the Appropriate Information Use Policy that
explains that we comply with state and laws. I
am going to say, yes, it is covered here.
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AC-9

PREVIOUS LOGON
(ACCESS)
NOTIFICATION
AC-10 CONCURRENT
SESSION CONTROL

X

This is covered under Log Maintenance Policy.
X?

AC-11 SESSION LOCK

X

AC-12 SESSION
TERMINATION

X

AC-13 SUPERVISION AND
REVIEW - ACCESS
CONTROL
AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS
WITHOUT
IDENTIFICATION OR
AUTHENTICATION
AC-15 AUTOMATED
MARKING
AC-16 SECURITY
ATTRIBUTES

X

AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS

X

X

I could not find this mentioned in the 27
polices. I know when I’m working in my
office and then walk out to the reference desk,
if I have email open in both places, a message
does appear that asks if I want to terminate
connection (or something to that extent). This
leads me to believe there is a policy, but I’m
not able to find it within these documents, yet.
The Log Maintenance Policy has a bullet point
about start up and shut down. It really does not
talk about session lock. Network Policy does
not talk about session lock. This is sort of
covered in Appropriate User Policy.
I’m really having a hard time finding this one,
as well. It is, also, somewhat, covered in
Appropriate User Policy.
Yes, this is, definitely, mentioned in User
Access Policy.
Network User ID Policy does state that nonstudent IDs can be obtained for specific
circumstances. (We do this in the library for
public patrons.)
There is not much stated here.

X
X

AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS

X

AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL
FOR MOBILE
DEVICES
AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
AC-21 INFORMATION
SHARING

X

I feel this is located in different Policies:
Appropriate Use Policy – Privacy Protections,
Network User ID with access privileges to
certain materials/database/information and
Portable Device Policy with limiting access
controls.
There is, specifically, a policy on Remote
Access Policy which also contains VPN
agreement, amongst other things.
I don’t feel the Portable Access Policy covers
wireless access.
I don’t feel the Portable Access Policy covers
wireless access.

X

Both Remote Access and Portable Device
Policies cover this.

X

FERPA - Appropriate Information Policy
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AC-22 PUBLICLY
ACCESSIBLE
CONTENT
AC-23 DATA MINING
PROTECTION
AC-24 ACCESS CONTROL
DECISIONS
AC-25 REFERENCE
MONITOR

X

Most of this is in Data Privacy Policy &
Appropriate Information Policy.

X

Most of this is in Data Privacy Policy &
Appropriate Information Policy.
I feel like this is, sort of, been covered but
Network User ID Policy.
Log Maintenance Policy

X
X

Summary Report
Review of 27 Information Security Policies at Columbus State University, Columbus, GA, were
paired with NIST standards found at https://nvd.nist.gov/. The 5 controls that are either deficient
or missing (will be further explained) are AC-10, AC-11, AC-12, AC-18, and AC-19. 20
Twenty controls were found in accordance to NIST STANDARDS.
AC-10: States that a limit to concurrent session should be assigned to an account. Nothing
seems to be stated within any policy as to how many sessions a user can have open. A test of the
control can be conducted, and an employee of the Columbus State University (i.e., this writer)
has experienced a message that warns that another session is open, when utilizing another device.
While that may be what happens, there is not a stated policy that was found to say how many
sessions could be open at one time within the 27 policies listed.
AC-11: Session lock was not found within the policy (see AC-12).
AC-12: This reviewer could not find anything about session timeout or termination of session.
Testing the computer on the network does reveal that at some point in time relogging on to the
network is required. Additionally, certain applications or systems, such as the learning
management system, does have a timeout that is sooner than network session termination.
Additionally, library databases or third-party applications may also have a timeout feature which
happens through a proxy server. As far as an official policy, this reviewer could not find that out
from policies reviewed.
Solutions
AC-10 – AC-12 have the same remedy: write a policy pertaining to what is actually being
practiced on the site. The safeguards of session termination and concurrent session are being
executed by the network but are not found in policy. I would recommend stating, within these
policies, the maximum time a session should be terminated based on the One USG login. The
reasoning behind this is that all other applications seem to terminate before this time frame.
As for the concurrent sessions, this is a little harder to determine. This is where a discussion
with network IT administrators, cybersecurity IT, and instructors needs to happen. This will
need to be determined by the “load” the network can handle versus productivity and lifestyle of
the students. The overall goal is not to limit access to one device at a time in an education
setting.
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Concurrent User Policy Resources for Remedies
https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/what-does-concurrent-session-mean
https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSPREK_9.0.0/com.ibm.isam.doc/wrp_config/c
oncept/con_max_concu_sess_plcy.html
AC-18 and AC-19 have several issues in meeting the NIST standards regarding the controls in
place for remote and wireless security policies. AC-18 talks about mutual authentication. AC19 has statements of virus scans and individual battery resources. Additionally, there are a good
number of control enhancements that would be very beneficial in a wireless security policy, such
as monitoring unauthorized connections and disabling wireless networking. This reviewer
recognizes the fact that there is a statement about devices being registered, but it is not, it seems,
logical to be able to find this information in a wireless security policy. What good is a policy
about wireless devices if it is located in some obscure location?
Side note: This reviewer has talked to a UITS staff in the library about hubs and wireless
security and has learned that residential students do have router signal limitations. I just do not
know if that is campus-wide and where exactly that policy is located.
Recommendation for AC-18 & AC-19: Craft a policy for wireless and mobile devices.

Resources
IBM. (n.d.). What does concurrent session mean? [webpage] IBM. Retrieved from
https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/what-does-concurrent-session-mean.
IBM. (n.d.). maximum Concurrent Session Policy. [Webpage] IBM Knowledgbase. Retrieved from

https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSPREK_9.0.0/com.ibm.isam.doc/wrp_config/concept/c
on_max_concu_sess_plcy.html
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Appendix B - Library Cybersecurity Communication Survey
(Word Document Print (Defers Slightly When Printed out in Word Document Format))
Survey Flow
Standard: Informed Consent (1 Question)
Block: Section 1: Background Information (2 Questions) (2 Questions)
Standard: Section 2: Prioritizing Cybersecurity Threats (2 Questions)
Standard: Section 3: Direct Communication of Policy (4 Questions)
Standard: Section 4: Cybersecurity Policy Creation or Participation (3 Questions)
Standard: Section 5: Reporting Procedures (4 Questions)
Standard: Section 6: Things that get left out (1 Question)
Standard: Section 7: Overall Reflective Barometer (1 Question)
Page Break
Start of Block: Informed Consent
You are being asked to participate in a research project conducted by Paul Luft, a student in the
Masters of Cybersecurity Management program at Columbus State University. [If this project is
student-led, provide the name of the faculty member supervising the study: Dr. Lydia Ray.]
I. Purpose: The purpose of this project is to provide information pertaining to a thesis involving
communication gaps between librarians, University Information Technology Systems Services
(UITS), and the archivist.
II. Procedures: A survey will be presented to the system librarians, UITS, and archivist. The
survey will be no more than 20 questions and should not take more than one hour to complete.
There will be no use of this data for other studies or any future use for research.
III. Possible Risks or Discomforts: No risk is expected other than possible nervousness when
answering the survey questions. This can be alleviated by the option to not answer a particular
question, if persons feel uncomfortable about answering. All information will be anonymous.
IV. Potential Benefits: It is expected that benefits from completing this survey will lead to
enhanced cybersecurity policies and cooperation between departments.
V. Costs and Compensation: No compensation will be provided to the participants.
VI. Confidentiality: Data and survey will be confidential. Master Student will only be able to
access data through Qualtrics (an online survey software) which will not identify individuals
taking the survey. The data, itself, will be published but with no trace as to the participant who
answered the questions. All data entered by the participants will be encrypted by Qualtrics by
default. The Qualtrics survey settings will be modified so that the survey will NOT collect the IP
addresses of the participants. The Qualtrics survey software is associated with the CSU account
and, hence, is protected by this Master Student’s password. The Qualtrics data may be
downloaded to an excel sheet for further analysis by Master Student researcher. The laptop has
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password protection. Only Master Student will have access to the excel sheet. The excel sheet
and Qualtrics data will be deleted within one year of project completion.
VII. Withdrawal: Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may withdraw from
the study at any time, and your withdrawal will not involve penalty or loss of benefits.
For additional information about this research project, you may contact the Principal
Investigator, Paul J. Luft, at 706-507-8641, or at luft_paul@columbusstate.edu. If you have
questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact Columbus State University
Institutional Review Board at irb@columbusstate.edu.
I have read this informed consent form. If I had any questions, they have been answered. By
selecting the I agree radial and Submit, I agree to participate in this research project.
o

I agree (1)

o

I disagree (2)

Skip To: End of Survey If You are being asked to participate in a research project conducted by
Paul Luft, a student in the... = I disagree
End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Section 1: Background Information (2 Questions)
Q1 Please identify which of the following group you belong to:
o

UITS, (1)

o

Systems Librarian, (2)

o

Archivist (3)

Q2 Please list University (Optional)
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Section 1: Background Information (2 Questions)

Start of Block: Section 2: Prioritizing Cybersecurity Threats (2 Questions)
Q4 Rank the following cybersecurity concerns as according to priority, with 0 being the lowest
concern and 10 being the highest concern:
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High Priority: A cybersecurity threat that you perceive will likely happen, causing severe issues
with workflow and privacy AND no matter what little budget you have, you would put money
toward combating the threat.
Medium Priority: A cybersecurity threat that you perceive may happen with consequence to
workflow and privacy AND are willing to put some money on a limited budget toward
combating the threat.
Low Priority: A cybersecurity threat that is unlikely to happen but still might have consequences
to workflow and privacy AND you would only put money toward combating the threat if you
had extra money to do so.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Ransomware of library systems ()
Unauthorized access of library network ()
Unauthorized access of network from within the library. I.e. Wi-Fi range network ()
Password Protection of library systems ()
Malware on library patron computers ()
Malware from lost & found personal devices such as USB ()
Data Breach from library computers and servers ()
Copyright Infringement of journal databases/thesis/research ()
Copyright infringement of electronic archival material ()
Journal Database theft ()
Digital Collection theft ()
Personal Identification theft associated with university network ()
Personal Identification theft associated with library Wi-Fi ()
Personal Identification theft associated with Library RFID (pretend you have one, if you don’t) ()
Personal Identification theft associated Library Accounts ()
Personal Identification theft associated with Archive Accounts ()
Personal Identification theft associated with archive billing and/or outside university request ()
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Email phishing attacks (Students and Staff) ()
Man-in-the-Middle Attack (People hijacking or listening in on the network) ()
Network Listening Devices (Library patrons) ()
Equipment Tamper (computer, USB cords, fax machines, wall outlets, charging stations) ()
Archival digital collection protection from corruption or malicious alteration ()
Q5 2. Were you aware of these threats?
o

I was aware of all of the threats (4)

o

I was aware of a majority of these threats (11 or more but not all) (5)

o

I was not aware of less than a majority (less than 11) (6)

End of Block: Section 2: Prioritizing Cybersecurity Threats (2 Questions)

Start of Block: Section 3: Direct Communication of Policy (4 Questions)
Q6 How well do you feel that cybersecurity policy is communicated to your department?
Very Well (1) Somewhat Well (2)

Neutral (3)

Somewhat Not Well (4)

Not at

All (5)
How well do you feel that cybersecurity policy is communicated to your department? (1) o
o
o
o
o
Q7 How familiar are you with all aspects of university cybersecurity policy?
(4)

Very Familiar (1)
Somewhat Familiar (2)
Very Unfamiliar (5)

Nuetral (3)

Somewhat Unfamiliar

How familiar are you with all aspects of university cybersecurity policy (1)
o
o
o
o
Q8 3. How often do you review the policy for policy changes?
o

Every 1-3 Months (1)

o

Every 6 Months (2)

o

Every Year (3)

o
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o

Every 2 Years (4)

o

Never (5)

Q9 How are new policy changes communicated to you? (May Select Multiple Answers)
▢

Direct Email (1)

▢

Website Updates (2)

▢

Announcements in Meetings (3)

▢

Other (4)

▢

Not At All (5)

End of Block: Section 3: Direct Communication of Policy (4 Questions)
Start of Block: Section 4: Cybersecurity Policy Creation or Participation (3 Questions)
Q10 I have been involved in creating cybersecurity policy for the library.
All the Time (1)

Often (2)

Neutral (3)

Not Much (4) Not At ALL (5)

I have been involved in creating cybersecurity policy for the library. (1)
o
o
o

o

o

Q11 Have you ever been asked to provide your opinion about university cybersecurity policy?
o

Yes (1)

o

Maybe (2)

o

No (3)

Q12 How often is library cybersecurity policy reviewed for change or edits?
o

Once Every 6 Months (1)

o

Yearly (2)

o

Every 2 Years (3)

o

When there is an Issue or event that warrants change (4)

o

There is no specific library cybersecurity policy (5)
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End of Block: Section 4: Cybersecurity Policy Creation or Participation (3 Questions)
Start of Block: Section 5: Reporting Procedures (4 Questions)
Q13 Have you reported a cybersecurity issue or asked to resolve a cybersecurity issue or event?
o

Yes (1)

o

No (2)

Q14 If Yes, was the result of report ever communicated back to you or was a policy changed
from UITS resulting from the report?
o

Yes (1)

o

No (2)

o

I answered No, so this does not apply to me (3)

Q15 Have you ever been shown any reports indicating threats or activities of possible threats?
o

Yes (1)

o

No (2)

Q16 Are you ever given any indication of the health/quality/status of your cybersecurity efforts?
o

Yes (1)

o

No (2)

End of Block: Section 5: Reporting Procedures (4 Questions)
Start of Block: Section 6: Things that get left out (1 Question)
Q17 Are you aware of any library or archive cybersecurity policies that are not included in
university general cybersecurity policies (examples -- Thumb drive discovery of unknown
owner that is screened for antivirus before inserted into computer to find its owner, or library cell
phone cords checked for inserted hijacking or listening devices, etc.) If yes, please give the name
of policy and, if you could, the general gist of the policy.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Section 6: Things that get left out (1 Question)
Start of Block: Section 7: Overall Reflective Barometer
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Q18 How well do you feel that cybersecurity policy is communicated to your department on a
scale 1-10, with 10 being that cybersecurity policies are communicated clearly through proper
modes of delivery and with appropriate frequency.

End of Block: Section 7: Overall Reflective Barometer
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Appendix C - Question 4 - Raw Data

